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I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, health care services in the United States have been delivered by
providers organized as separate economic and legal entities.3 Hospitals,
physicians and various allied health professionals all had distinct roles in a
system of care that was rarely a model of efficiency.
In light of the ever-increasing costs of health care however, health care
purchasers, including public and private organizations, are demanding that
3Andrew J. Demetriou & Thomas E. Dutton, Health Care Integration: Structural and
Legal Issues, § 1300.01 (BNA'S HEALTH L. & Bus. SERIES No. 1300, 1996); see also Amy J.
Woodhall, Integrated Delivery Systems: Reforming the Conflicts Among Federal Referral, Tax
Exemption, and Antitrust Laws, 5 HEALTH MATRIX: JOURNAL OF LAW-MEDICINE 181, 182
(Winter 1995).
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costs be reduced and quality be improved.4 The financial incentives that existed
under traditional health insurance programs rewarded providers for the
increased utilization of services. The current impetus for cost reduction has
resulted in the organization of systems that function successfully in an
environment where the delivery of care and the reimbursement of that care are
both managed.
Payers have encouraged this development of managed care systems, in
which health care consumers are given access to care but only after consultation
with and often the approval of a gatekeeper physician or other professional.
Payers are also increasingly asking providers to accept some of the financial
risk associated with the delivery of care to a defined population, as a way of
controlling if not predicting costs. Once separate provider groups are now
joining forces to develop systems that address payer concerns about cost and
quality.
As a result of these pressures, cataclysmic changes are transforming the
health care industry. In the 1990's for example, we have seen extensive
restructuring of health care delivery systems. In terms of delivery, the health
care industry is evolving away from hospital centered systems. In terms of
payment, the industry is shifting away from traditional fee-for-service
reimbursement to a sharing of financial risk with providers.
Hospitals and physicians are forming networks that integrate certain
delivery and insurance functions and thereby enable the providers to sell their
services directly to employers and other payers. Even if networks decide to
allow insurers and others like HMOs to market the network's services,
providers are in a better bargaining position for their compensation. These
efforts may result in some level of integration; however, the parties often end
up with a transitional system that lacks total integration and delivers less than
the full range of services while engaging in some insurance functions.
Against this backdrop, health care continues to be subject to extensive yet
ever changing regulations at both the federal and state levels. As the industry
responds to these changing regulatory forces and the industry's efforts to
control health care costs, the traditional roles played by providers and payers
are being reconsidered and often restructured into new configurations. The
restructuring of any industry as large and complex as health care sometimes
brings to light conflicting laws as well as public policies that underpin the laws
and regulations governing this sector of the U.S. economy.
4Until recently, the conventional wisdom has been that health care costs are on the
rise in this country at an alarming rate. See Randolph S. Jordan, Regulation of Provider
Risk Sharing and Other Limitations on Risk Bearing Provider Networks, § 2300:101 (BNA'S
HEALTH LAW & Bus. SERIES No. 2300,1996) (citingKatharine R. Levit et al., NationalHealth
Spending Trends 1960-1993, 13 HEALTH AFFAIRS 14 (1994) ("In 1960, $27.1 billion was
expended in the U.S. for health care services, compared to $884.2 billion in 1993"); but
see Clark C. Havighurst, Contract Failure in the Market for Health Services, 29 WAKE FOREST
L. REv. 47 (1994) (Professor Havighurst finds much of the evidence regarding health
care overspending to be inconclusive.).
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Health care legal advisors are often called on to rationalize and synthesize
these conflicting laws and policies while assisting clients to meet current
market demands in developing competitive integrated delivery systems
("IDS"). This article explores the myriad of laws and regulations that affect
integrated delivery systems development and proposes a practical approach
for reconciling conflicting laws and policies. Some legal practitioners may
recognize the proposed method as the process they already follow. For others,
the suggestions in this article will hopefully challenge them to see conflicts of
law and policy as opportunities to engage in creative thinking.
Part II of this article provides an overview of the models being used to
develop integrated delivery systems and briefly discusses the continuum of
integration. Part III proposes a businesslike framework for resolving and
synthesizing conflicting laws and policies in the context of hypothetical IDS
that is used to illustrate certain conflicts. Part IV provides an overview of the
laws, regulations, and public policies implicated in developing an IDS. Using
the example IDS and other integration models, Part V identifies and analyzes
several conflicts created by existing laws and regulations.
II. INTEGRATED DELIVERY SYSTEMS
A. The Impetus For the Development of the Integrated Delivery System
Due to the aging of the baby-boom generation and the ever-increasing costs
of health care, both public and private payers are concerned they will be unable
in the future, as they have in the past, to provide basic health care coverage to
older Americans. Although the federal government has been unsuccessful to
date in passing comprehensive health care reform legislation, the private sector
(motivated in part by the fear that the government will become overly involved
in the restructuring of the health care system if the private sector fails to
implement reform) continues to restructure in order to address the dual
concerns of cost and quality.
As a result of the governmental attention and industry initiatives, many
Americans are now familiar with the terms managed care or managed competition.
The managed competition theory has been associated recently with the Clinton
administration's efforts to develop and implement reform legislation. 5 Under
managed competition, consumers are given a wide range of enrollment options
among different private health plans which compete in the marketplace to
provide the maximum value for the subscriber's dollar.6
5 See, e.g., Health Security Act, H.R. 3600, S. 1757, S. 1775,103d. Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
6 See Catherine T. Dunlay & Peter A. Pavarini, Managed Competition Theory as a Basis
for Health Care Reform, 27 AKRON L. REV. 141, 142 (1993). (The managed competition
theory posits that costs will be controlled because the consumer will have choices among
these competing plans. The primary goals under managed care and managed
competition policies are to increase the quality of health care services and at the same
time reduce (or at least slow the increase of) the overall cost of health care.).
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Both the configuration and competitiveness of gestational IDSs are critical
to the success of this market-oriented approach to reforming. Competitive
reformers believe that IDS's will constitute the organizational framework for
controlling health care costs in the managed competition environment.7 First,
IDS's will develop governance mechanisms and incentive systems to control
provider behavior. Second, competitive interaction among rival systems will
ensure that systems do not stray from the goal of cost containment.
8
An IDS is an organization that furnishes patients with all levels and types of
health care services from affiliated providers and that clinically integrates
through coordinated case management and inter-provider information
systems.9 The movement towards an integrated industry includes affiliations
and alliances among physicians and hospitals (and in some instances
insurers10) as market forces cause previously fragmented providers to
consolidate. An IDS typically involves the merger of physician and hospital
services in and effort to align economic incentives often under a common
parent or system.11
IDS's often provide a package of hospital, physician, and ancillary health
services 12 designed to offer payers one stop shopping for all their health care
needs and a single entity to engage for managed care contracts. 13 To succeed
in today's managed care environment, the system must assist the patient in
making an informed health care decision and provide the service in an efficient,
economical manner.1 4 The more common integration models for physicians
7Thomas L. Greaney, National Health Care Reform on Trial, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1507,
1508 (1994) (The term "integration" refers to the creation of clinical and economic
relationships between providers in an effort to increase the availability, efficiency and
quality of services as well as decrease the cost of services.).
81d.
9See Carl H. Hitchner et al., Integrated Delivery Systems: A Survey of Organizational
Models, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 273 (1994); see also Woodhall, supra note 3, at 184.
(Clinical integration occurs through the integration of health services delivered by the
system from the patient's viewpoint. Economic integration occurs by developing
linkages among the providers in the health care system through common ownership,
governance and management. Functional integration occurs through common strategic
planning and quality improvement.).
lOd.
11Demetriou & Dutton, supra note 3, at 1300:101.
12 Hitchner et al., supra note 9, at 274.
131d.
14Demetriou & Dutton, supra note 3, at 1300:101-1300:102 (Recognized goals of
integrated systems include managed care contracting directly with payers; providing
direct health care services to patients; accepting some risk for the costs of services to be
provided; developing information systems to manage risk; conducting utilization
review and quality assurance; developing joint treatment protocols and standards to
improve the delivery of care; creating efficiencies and economies of scale toreducecosts;
and providing greater access to capital.).
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and hospitals include physician-hospital organizations, management services
organizations, medical foundations, fully integrated delivery systems and at
the far end of the integration spectrum, integrated organizations that offer both
a licensed insurance product as well as a full-service provider organization.15
B. Integration Strategies
1. Physician-Hospital Organizations
One of the least integrated of the models is the physician-hospital
organization, or PHO. In this model, a hospital and a local group of physicians
affiliate in an effort to attract managed care contracts. 16 The PHO may be
formed as a separate legal entity, or the relationship may be purely contractual.
The PHO provides certain basic managed care organization functions
including the negotiation of managed care contracts, utilization review and
quality assurance.1 7
The PHO may have authority to enter into managed care contracts with
payers which require the PHO's physician and hospital members to provide
services to the payer's plan beneficiaries. Unlike other integration models, the
PHO is not directly responsible to the payer for the delivery of the services. 18
Additionally, PHOs are often not substantially capitalized by its members as
the hospitals and physicians do not contribute their assets to the PHO.19
2. Management Services Organizations
The management services organization, or MSO, provides management
services to physicians or physician groups. MSOs are typically affiliated with
an IDS or hospital system and may be operated as a service of a hospital or a
wholly owned subsidiary of the hospital. They are often investor-owned or
15A complete discussion of the various forms and levels of integration is beyond the
scope of this article. Each model offers varying degrees of clinical and economic
integration. The form of the IDS varies as a function of the business realities of the
situation tempered by existing federal and state legal constraints which make it difficult
to categorize with any precision all the models being used. Conflicts, however, are
inherent in varying degrees regardless of the model chosen. See Demetriou & Dutton,
supra note 3, at 1300:102-1300:107 (discussing the various integration models in use
today; see also Hitchner et al., supra note 9, at 274).
16Id.
17 Managed care contract refers to any contract with a payer to provide services at a
contract rate that includes some type of risk sharing for the delivery of services by the
provider. Common forms of risk sharing include significant financial withholdings of
premium amounts which are divided by the providers and if certain cost incentives are
reached and capitation whereby providers are typically given a per-member-per-month
amount to provide all the contract services to the plan beneficiary.
18 Demetriou & Dutton, supra note 3, at 1300:103.
191d.
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jointly owned by hospitals and physicians. 20 The MSO may be organized as a
corporation, a partnership, a nonprofit corporation, or a limited liability
company.2
1
MSOs can be organized to offer complete "turnkey" management services to
physicians, or physicians can be given the option of selecting various services
as needed from a menu of management services provided by the MSO.22 The
primary advantages of the MSO model for physicians is that MSOs relieve
physicians of their day-to-day administrative burdens, and the physicians
continue to establish their own compensation and retirement plans.23
3. The Foundation Model
In the foundation model, the attributes of the PHO and the MSO are
combined. The foundation can be established as a nonprofit corporation. It may
own and operate one or more large clinics that offer complete ambulatory care,
including both primary and specialty physician services.24 Foundations may
employ physicians directly or staff facilities with independent contractor
physicians. The foundation may be independent, affiliated with a hospital, or
part of a larger IDS. A hospital or hospital system is typically the sponsor and
owner of the foundation. 25
Like the PHO, the foundation provides managed care contracting, utilization
review and quality assurance, and like the MSO also provides management
services and a vehicle for acquiring physician practices. The primary difference
between the foundation model and the lesser integrated models is the
foundation contracts directly with payers to provide comprehensive health
20 Hitchner et al., suipra note 9, at 274. Hitchner and his co-authors posit that an MSO
is subject to several definitions and understandings of its meaning and also may be
referred to as a managed service organization or a medical services organization. In
turnkey MSOs, the MSO acquires the physician's practice assets and agrees to employ
all of the practice's non-physician personnel. The physicians, however, continue to own
their own practices and the revenues generated thereby. The primary advantage to the
IDS is that the MSO can be used to induce physicians to participate in the IDS. Like the
PHO, the MSO can negotiate managed care contracts on behalf of the physicians it
serves. Moreover, physicians can be encouraged to participate in the IDS through
"lock-in" covenants in the MSO's management and acquisition agreements.
Post-termination covenants including non-compete agreements, asset buy-back
provisions and retention of office space agreements can be used by the MSO to
discourage physicians from terminating the MSO and therefore from disassociating
with the IDS. Id.
21 Id.
22Demetriou & Dutton, siipra note 3, at 1300:104.
23Id.
24 Hitchner et al., supra note 9, at 297.
251d. at 297-98.
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care services to the payer's plan beneficiaries. 26 Physician groups and hospitals
become subcontractors to the foundation to provide the health care services to
beneficiaries.
4. The Fully Integrated Model
In a fully integrated system, physicians and hospitals consolidate their assets
under common ownership held by hospitals, physicians, investors, or a
combination of any of the above. Physicians can be employed directly by the
IDS or in states like Ohio that continue to follow the corporate practice of
medicine doctrine, physicians can be employed through an IDS-controlled
clinic.27 The providers in the IDS are under common governance and control
by one board which ensures the alignment of the providers' economic and
other incentives. The IDS can be organized as a taxable, for profit entity or a
tax-exempt, nonprofit entity. 28
5. Payer-Provider Model
The payer-provider model, as its name implies, combines the financing of
health care with the delivery of care. 29 This model is like the fully integrated
model in that the providers of health services are integrated under a common
parent; however, this model also includes an insurance component that can be
directly marketed to consumers. The payer-provider model is often formed
when an HMO acquires a health care delivery system or when a provider
system organizes as either a staff or group model HMO.30
26 Demetriou & Dutton, supra note 3, at 1300:105 (Because the foundation contracts
directly with payers to provide services, the foundation owns the managed care
contracts and can internally divide the managed care revenues with and create risk pools
for the subcontract hospital and physician providers. This direct contracting function
can subject the foundation to state insurance regulations if the foundation assumes the
insurance risk, as defined under state law, of providing health care benefits to the plan's
beneficiaries.) Id.
271d. As discussed further in Part III, tax-exemption raises several issues for the IDS
or its members including limitations on physician representation on the governing
board and physician ownership of the IDS. The benefits of tax-exemption include access
to capital at favorable rates through the tax-exempt bond market and savings from the
avoidance of federal and state taxes. Id.
281d. at 1300:106. If the IDS is formed as a for profit entity and a nonprofit, tax-exempt
hospital or other entity contributes assets, issues concerning the conversion of charitable
assets to for profit uses and the private use of tax-exempt financed facilities must be
analyzed. Id.
29 Hitchner et al., supra note 9, at 302.
30 Demetriou & Dutton, supra note 3, at 1300:106 (The staff model HMO is one in
which the physicians are employed by the HMO, while under the group model, the
physicians belong to a group that is affiliated with the HMO.).
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III. FRAMEWORK FOR RESOLUTION
A. The IDS
The first step in the conflict resolution process set forth below is to identify
the client's objectives for the transaction. For purposes of discussion, assume
that a nonprofit, tax-exempt hospital client and a group of physicians are
considering developing an IDS formed as a limited liability company.
The hospital client is concerned with developing an IDS that will improve
the health care services delivered to residents in its primarily rural service area.
The hospital's board desires that the IDS be subject to local control and sustain
a community orientation consistent with the hospital's tax-exempt purposes.
The board wishes to provide health care that is accessible, affordable, and state
of the art to prevent further out migration of the hospital's patient base.
The hospital's payers would like the hospital to assume risk under managed
care contracts. Although the hospital board wants to maintain some control
over the IDS, it recognizes that physician participation, especially primary care
physicians, is critical to the success of the IDS in a managed care environment.
With these objectives in mind, the hospital board and the physicians in the
community are considering the development of an IDS. The IDS will engage
in such things as managed care and traditional fee-for service-contracting,
health care services delivery, risk sharing among providers, information
systems development, utilization review, quality assurance, and the
development of joint treatment protocols.
The hospital will own 50% of the Class A membership interests and the
physicians will own the other 50% of the Class A membership interests. The
hospital will also own all of the Class B membership interests. The Class B
membership interests will be created to give the hospital a preferred interest in
profits and liquidating distributions in return for the hospital providing the
bulk of the capital for creating the IDS.
The governing board will consist of ten managers. Five managers will be
elected by the physician Class Amembers, and five managers will be appointed
by the hospital board. Ordinary IDS board actions require the approval of both
the physician managers and the hospital managers with each group voting as
a class. The affirmative vote of 3 of the 5 managers in a class of managers is
required to approve an action. If the classes are deadlocked on a strategic
issue,31 the Class B member's vote will break the deadlock.
A professional corporation would be formed to employ or contract with
individual physicians to provide physician services to the IDS. The IDS will
enter into services agreements with both member and non-member physicians
as well as the hospital and the physician corporation. These agreements
authorize the IDS to engage in contracting on behalf of the member and bind
the participants to the IDS's clinical protocols. Physicians may also participate
31 Defined as an issue that will affect the continued viability of the entity as an
ongoing business concern (e.g., merger, large expenditures, sale of assets, dissolution).
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in other provider networks, but currently no other networks are forming in the
area.
Compensation arrangements for physicians will be developed to emphasize
efficiency and eliminate unnecessary services. Productivity bonuses will be
provided based on patient satisfaction surveys, achievement of cost goals,
provision of charity care, and productivity.
B. Resolving Conflicts
Although each of the integration models discussed in Part II provides unique
legal challenges, the hypothetical IDS will be used to illustrate certain conflicts.
One of primary challenges facing legal counsel to the IDS is to develop a
strategy for reconciling conflicts in a manner that not only satisfies the client,
but also satisfies conflicting legal requirements.
1. Traditional Conflicts Resolution
Courts continue to be the final arbiter in resolving conflict of law issues
whenever a state's legislature has not done so by specific mandate. Legislators
and regulatory agencies, however, because of a lack of time and resources, may
not anticipate or consider how various regulations and policy decisions affect
the application of other existing laws and regulations. 32 Accordingly, courts are
often left to their own devices in resolving conflicts. The conflicts of law
problem is exacerbated as the influence of the administrative state will continue
to grow in the future.
The rules and doctrines courts follow to resolve conflicts have been
described as confusing, unpredictable, and even incoherent. 33 Conflicts
doctrines typically address the resolution of conflicts between the laws of two
separate sovereigns, often two states.34 Under traditional rules, the state where
the last significant event concerning the dispute occurred is often the state
whose law controls.35
If the conflict involves federal and state law and an actual conflict exists such
that compliance with both is not possible, federal law prevails under the
supremacy clause.36 Federal law also prevails if the state law stands as an
32See Joel P. Trachtman, Conflict of Laws and Accuracy in the Allocation of Government,
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 975, 983-84 (1996).
33Id. at 985. (This theory is often referred to as the vested rights doctrine).
340ne classic conflict of law example is in tort law. If a resident of State A is injured
by a product manufactured in State B, does State A or State B's law control assuming
they are in conflict? If State A's law favors recovery and State B's does not, a court's
determination becomes crucial to the outcome of the case. Courts decide what law to
apply based on various conflicts of law rules and doctrines.
35 Trachtman, supra note 32, at 999.
36U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. "rhis Constitution, and the laws of United States... shall
be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
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obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of the federal scheme 37 or if Congress has expressly or implicitly
preempted the field.3 8
The implicit preemption doctrine derives from the supremacy clause and
provides that federal law preempts state law if a federal regulatory scheme is
so pervasive that Congress left no room for the States to supplement federal
regulation of the field. 39 Preemption only applies, however, in limited
situations and only if compliance with both federal and state law is
impossible.40
Traditional doctrines and rules may not be helpful to counsel in resolving
conflicting laws or policies in IDS development, however, because many of the
identified conflicts occur between two federal laws or policies. Only limited
guidance exists regarding the courts' resolution process for conflicts among
two federal laws or policies. One approach may be to determine if any federal
agencies have considered the conflict. Courts may be inclined to defer to agency
discretion 41 unless the interpretation is contrary to the plain meaning of the
statute or the court believes resolution of the conflict is outside the agency's
area of expertise. 42
Courts have also said that one federal law cannot violate another federal law
and that if two federal laws are in irreconcilable conflict, the later one merely
repeals the earlier law.43 Other courts have used a sort of balancing test to
resolve conflicting laws and policies. 44 One theory that has been discussed in
the context of resolving conflicts among separate sovereigns may, by analogy,
Thus, federal laws or regulations supersede conflicting state laws. Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
37Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
38A good example of Congressional express statutory preemption of a fiield is in the
area of the ERISA laws. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
39 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,230 (1947).
40Solorzano v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. Rptr.2d 161, 169 (1992).
41See Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U.S. 83 (1990) and K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. 486
U.S. 281 (1988) (as examples of situations where the Rehnquist court has deferred to
agency interpretations of statutes the agency administers). There is also a strong
presumption in the law that an agency's interpretation of its own regulations is correct.
Mullins Coal Co. of Virginia v. Director, OWCP, 484 U.S. 135 (1987). Whether this
presumption extends to an agency's interpretation of the interaction between its statute
and another's is debatable.
42High Craft Clothing Co. v. NLRB, 660 F.2d 910, 915-16 (3d Cir. 1981).
43United States v. Connecticut, 566 F. Supp. 571, 578 (1983). Deference, however,
appears to be too simplistic of an approach in this context.
44 See Trachtman, supra note 32, at 1011. (Professor Trachtman describes Professor
Leflar's Better Law Factor approach as a balancing of interests test that courts use to
resolve conflicts of law).
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provide insight as to how a court could resolve conflicting law or policy
between agencies of the same sovereign.
This theory involves the weighing of the conflicting policies pursuant to
certain principles, which are set forth below under step four in the
recommended approach. The law which reflects the more important of the two
policies is chosen by the court (or by counsel providing pre-transaction
analysis) as the law that must be observed.
2. Recommended Approach
Although traditional conflicts theory may not provide all the answers, a
review of this theory helps to identify certain principles counsel can follow
when resolving conflicts in IDS development. At the front end of the
transaction, it is always better to avoid potential agency challenges to the IDS
structure and its activities rather than risk litigation that may provide a
resolution to the conflict but only after the expenditure of great time and
expense.
Many conflicts can be reconciled if counsel follows a systematic approach in
analyzing the potential problem. In some situations, counsel may ask the IDS's
developers to modify the proposed IDS structure or transaction in a way that
harmonizes the conflicting laws but is also consistent with the client's
objectives. The following outline sets forth one approach which counsel can
follow when faced with conflict of law situations.
1. Analyze the structure and the goals for developing the IDS or
engaging in the particular transaction based on the client's
description of the proposed activity.
2. Identify the legal issues involved in developing the IDS and
the apparent conflicts in law or policy.
3. Reconsider and prioritize the client's objectives in developing
the IDS in light of the conflict and any legal barriers created by
the conflict.
4. Promote the more important law or policy after considering
the relative importance of the conflicting laws and their
underlying policies according to the following principles:
a. a law or policy that is strongly held by the legislature should
be encouraged;
b. choose an emerging law or policy over one embodying an
outdated or regressive policy;
c. specific laws and policies have priority over more general
ones; and
d. select the law best designed to effectuate an underlying
policy.
45
45 See EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFUCT OF LAWS, § 2.8 (1984). (These
principles have been set forth as guidelines that courts may use in weighing and
comparing of the merits of two conflicting law's underlying policies. These principles
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5. Reconfigure the IDS's business arrangement after considering:
a. any exceptions to the law or regulation at issue;
b. agency interpretations concerning the transaction at issue or
similar transactions such as advisory opinions, business
review letters, and private letter rulings; and
c. alternative organizational structures or operational
arrangements that not only accomplish the client's goals but
also meet the legal requirements of the laws or policies
implicated.
6. If a particular conflict cannot be reconciled in this manner,
determine and comply with the law that will allow the client
to satisfy its most important objectives and advise the client
regarding the legal risks associated with satisfying lesser
objectives.
IV. REGULATORY OVERVIEW OF LAWS AFFECTING IDS DEVELOPMENT
A. Federal Tax Laws
Laws relating to tax-exempt organizations are often implicated because the
IDS may seek tax-exemption or, like the hypothetical IDS, the driving force
behind the development of the IDS is the sole tax-exempt, nonprofit hospital
in the community. Historically, nonprofit hospitals have been given tax
exemption because they provide charitable health care services to the
indigent.46 To achieve tax exemption, the IDS or the hospital must generally be
organized to promote the health of the community and be operated for
charitable purposes as defined by IRS regulations and agency interpretations.
No part of the tax-exempt's net earnings may inure to the benefit of any
private individual or shareholder,47 the exempt organization may only serve
public rather than private interests, and any private benefit conferred must
only be incidental.48 These requirements are commonly referred to as the
"private inurement"49 and the "private benefit" prohibitions.50
are suggested as analytical tools only. It is very difficult if not impossible, to determine
how a particular court might in the future reconcile conflicting policies.).
46See John R. Washlick,, Nonprofit Healthcare Organizations: Federal Income Tax Issues,
873 TAx MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIOS, p. A-2 (Tax Management Inc., 1996). (Providing such
health services has long been considered a charitable purpose under the general law of
charitable trusts. Although modem hospitals generally receive some form of
reimbursement from the government for providing care to the financially needy, the
availability of private entities willing to provide services to needy persons is of concern
to the government and provides a strong justification for the exemption.); see also Nina
J. Crimm, Evolutionary Forces: Changes in For-Profit and Not-For-Profit Health Care Delivery
Structures; A Regeneration of Tax Exemption Standards, 37 B.C.L. REV. 1 (1995).
4 7 1.R.C. § 501(c)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(a)-l(c).
4 8 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii).
4 9 See Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 Nov. 21, 1991); Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,498 (Jan. 28,
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If a tax-exempt hospital contributes assets to the IDS, the hospital must
consider the conversion of some or all of its assets from charitable to for profit
uses which do not warrant exemption. Not for profit conversions have received
increased scrutiny by the Attorneys General of several states.51 Any violations
of the aforementioned doctrines could result in the hospital participant in the
IDS losing its exempt status or the IDS itself failing to attain exempt status.
Instead of revoking the tax-exempt status of an organization, the IRS may
now impose intermediate sanctions against "disqualified persons" who engage
in "excess benefit" transactions with exempt organizations. 52 Disqualified
persons are insiders to the tax-exempt organization who exercise substantial
influence over the exempt organization. Penalty excise taxes may be imposed
in the range of 25% to 200% of the excess benefit.5 3
1986); Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,598 (Dec. 2, 1986). (The I.R.S. has developed a two-part test
for determining compliance with private inurement prohibition. First, the non-exempt
person participating in the transaction must be a shareholder or a person with a personal
or private interest in the activities of the exempt organization. Second, the net earnings
or benefit provided for the benefit of the private person must represent a dividend like
benefitbecause thebenefit is more than fair market value for any property given or more
than reasonable compensation for services.).
5 0 See Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,789 (Dec. 18, 1978); Gen. Couns. Mem.39, 598 (Dec. 2,
1986); Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 21, 1991) (The I.R.S. has developed a two-part
test for determining compliance with the private benefit prohibition. First, the private
benefit provided by the transaction must be necessary in order to obtain the benefits to
the public at large from the transaction. Second, the private benefit must be insubstantial
in light of the public benefit conferred by the transaction.).
5 1 See Michael W. Peregrine, State Attorneys General Increase Enforcement of Charitable
Trust and Fiduciary Duty Laws, HEALTH LAW DIGEST, v. 24, n.12, p.3 (December 1996) (Mr.
Peregrine provides examples of actions in several states to enforce charitable trust and
fiduciary duty laws as they apply to nonprofit health care corporations. State Attorney
General actions have been initiated to block (a) the whole hospital joint venture in
Michigan between Columbia/HCA and Michigan Affiliated Health care Systems, Inc.
(b) the conversion of nonprofit assets to for profit uses through the sale of the assets of
the tax-exempt Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Ohio to Columbia/HCA, and (c) the sale of
community hospitals such as Boca Raton Community Hospital, Inc. in Florida); see also
Ohio H.B. 824 (Rep. Van Vyven) and it companion Ohio S.B. 334 (Sen. Drake), and Ohio
H.B. 825 (Rep. Netzley) (These three bills were introduced in the Ohio legislature on
October 29, 1996. Generally, the proposed legislation requires public disclosure and
hearings regarding the terms of the transaction and clarifies that the Attorney General
must review and approve any proposed charitable asset conversion transactions.).
52 Pub. L. No. 104-168, 110 Stat. 1452 (1996).
53 1d. Excess benefit transactions are defined to include any transaction in which an
economic benefit is provided to, or for the use of, any disqualified person if the value
of the economic benefit provided, directly or indirectly, by the organization to such
person is greater than the value of the consideration (including the performance of
services) received by the organization for providing such benefit. Excess benefit
transactions also include any transaction, to the extent provided in Treasury
Department Regulations (to be published), in which the amount of any economic benefit
provided to, or for the use of, any disqualified person is determined in whole or in part
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B. Anti-Kickback and Self-Referral Laws
The federal anti-kickback statute prohibits the offer, solicitation, payment or
receipt of any remuneration, in cash or in kind for in return for, or to induce,
the referral of a patient for any service that may be paid by Medicare of
Medicaid.54 Remuneration has been defined to include almost anything of
value and includes both direct and indirect offers or payments.
The primary consideration under the anti-kickback statute is whether the
remuneration was paid or received as an inducement to refer. To find a violation
of the statute, the inquiry necessarily turns on whether an intent to refer can be
inferred under the circumstances. Unlike the Stark II laws discussed below
where intent is irrelevant, if an exception or safe harbor to the anti-kickback
statute is not completely satisfied, the transaction may not violate the statue
unless the requisite unlawful intent is proven.55
Federal law ("Stark I") prohibits physicians from referring Medicare and
Medicaid patients to entities with which they have a financial relationship for
the furnishing of "designated health services.' 56 The threshold inquiry under
by the revenues of the tax-exempt organization, provided the transaction constitutes
prohibited private inurement under existing law.
5442 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b(b).
55 The statute has been interpreted quite broadly. In United States v. Greber, the court
held that if one purpose of the payment made by an entity to a physician for services
rendered was to induce future referrals to that entity, the statute is violated. 760 F.2d
68, 69 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 988 (1985). This holding has been narrowed
by the court in The Hanlester Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390 (9th Cir. 1995). The court
in Hanlester held that the anti-kickback statute requires the person (1) to know the
statute prohibits offering or paying illegal remuneration and (2) to engage in prohibited
conduct with the "specific" intent to violate the law. Id. at 1400. The District Court for
the Southern District of Ohio has refused to follow Hanlester. In U.S. v. Neufeld, a
physician accused of violations of the anti-kickback statutes argued that the statute was
unconstitutional. 908 F.Supp. 491,493 (S.D. Ohio 1995). The court refused to require that
a specific intent to violate the statute be proven. Id. at 497. The court said that the mental
state required to find a "willful" violation is sufficient if it "takes into account the purpose
to commit a wrongful act." Id. The court recognized there is a heightened mental state
requirement in the statute but refused to provide an exact definition of the standard.
Although the intent required to violate the anti-kickback statute is unclear in light of
Neufeld and other decisions, these courts may be signaling a movement away from
Hanlester's specific intent requirement.
5642 U.S.C. § 1395nn ("Designated Health Services" under Stark II include: clinical
laboratory services; physical and occupational therapy services; radiology services
including MRI; CAT and ultrasound services; radiation therapy services and supplies;
durable medical equipment and supplies; parenteral and enteral nutrients equipment
and supplies; prosthetics; orthotics and prosthetic devices and supplies; outpatient
prescription drugs and inpatient and outpatient hospital services).
A recent interpretation of the federal physician self-referral prohibition is a final
rule issued by the Health Care Financing Administration ("HCFA") on August 14,1995.
Even though this rule specifically addresses only the referral prohibition concerning
clinical laboratory services ("Stark I"), HCFA indicated that this rule also affects how
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Stark II is whether designated health services are being provided. If designated
health services are identified, the next inquiry is whether a financial
relationship exists between the referring physician and the entity. A financial
relationship exists if the physician has an ownership or investment interest in
the facility or otherwise has a compensation arrangement with the entity.
The primary distinction between the two statutes is the situations they apply
to and the scienter requirement for finding a violation of the statute. In many
instances, both the anti-kickback and the Stark laws apply; however, the Stark
law does not apply in every situation where the anti-kickback statute applies.
Before Stark can be implicated in a transaction, physicians and designated
health services must be involved. Additionally, the anti-kickback statute
includes a scienter requirement whereas Stark could be violated regardless of
the parties' intentions.
The anti-kickback laws and the Stark laws are designed to prevent the
overutilization of services and to contain Medicare and Medicaid costs.57
Providers who are compensated whenever they refer patients may have an
incentive to overrefer, which increases utilization and overall costs to the
government. 58 Other important goals are the preservation of competition and
the freedom of patient choice.59
C. Antitrust
One of the most significant regulatory hurdles which an IDS faces is
compliance with the antitrust laws. Both the federal and state statutes address
antitrust issues. Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, "[elvery contract,
combination ... or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several states.. . is declared to be illegal..."60
Antitrust laws are enforced by both federal and state agencies, 61 but the most
significant enforcement occurs through federal agencies, namely the Federal
referrals involving any of the designated health services will be reviewed. See 60 Fed.
Reg. 41914, 41916.
57 James F. Blumstein, The Fraud and Abuse Statute in the Evolving Health Care
Marketplace: Life in the Health Care Speakeasy, 22 AM- J.L. & MED. 205, 207 (1996); see also
57 Fed. Reg. 8588 (1992) (Like the anti-kickback law, the federal physician self-referral
prohibition law ("Stark") was implemented to prevent overutilization and control the
cost of governmental health programs by preventing physicians from making certain
referrals).
581d. at 207.
591d. at 207, n.15.
6015 U.S.C. § 1; Federal enforcement policy related to an IDS's operations is set forth
in the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission's Policy Statements
(the "Policy Statements"). Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy and Analytical
Principles Relating to Health Care and Antitrust, (August 1996).
61 Similar to the federal restrictions, Ohio's Valentine Act proscribes any combination
of capital, skill or acts by two or more persons to create or carry out restrictions in trade
or commerce. O.R.C. § 1331.01(B) (Baldwin Supp. 1997). Presumably, a provider
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Trade Commission and the Department of Justice. Recent debate regarding the
application of the anti-trust laws in the health care industry has centered
around whether the laws have been applied to defeat necessary integration and
consolidation occurring in the industry.62
The policy that underlies the antitrust laws is the promotion of free and fair
competition in the marketplace through the elimination of practices which
interfere with such competition.63 The antitrust laws are designed to promote
a vigorous and competitive economy in which each business enterprise has a
full opportunity to compete on the basis of price, quality, and service, and
consumers can choose among a variety of suppliers.64
In developing an IDS, one of the primary antitrust concerns is always
whether the IDS will restrict competition in the relevant market.65 Restricted
competition can lead to increased prices, lower quality, reductions in services
offered, or reductions in technological innovation. 66 Depending on the
participants in the network, these concerns may be heightened. For example,
IDS's that result in horizontal integration among previously competing
providers (e.g., the IDS includes only hospitals or a physician's group with
substantially all of the physicians in the market) raise significant concerns
because of the direct loss of competition. 67
network which complies with federal antitrust requirements will also comply with
Ohio's Valentine Act. See Richter Concrete Corp. v. Hilltop Basic Resources, Inc., 547
F.Supp. 893, 920 (S.D. Ohio 1981), affd suib nom, Richter Concrete Corp. v. Hilltop
Concrete Corp., 691, F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1982).
62 See FredericJ. Entin et al.,Hospital Collaboration: The Needforan Appropriate Antitrust
Policy, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 107 (1994) (Entin and his colleagues argue that the federal
antitrust statutes, court decisions, and federal merger guidelines have created barriers
to necessary consolidation in the hospital industry. The failure of the federal agencies
to articulate a clear antitrust policy of enforcement for the health care industry also
contributes to perceived, if not real, barriers to integration among hospitals.); but see
David L. Meyer and Charles F. (Rick) Rule, Health Care Collaboration Does Not Require
Substantive Antitrust Reform, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 169 (1994) (Meyer and Rule argue
that federal antitrust laws and current enforcement policy provide a great deal of
flexibility for hospital and other provider collaboration and integration. They urge that
sensible enforcement, not immunities or other special treatment, is the key to ensuring
the health care industry continues to reform consistent with the antitrust laws.).
63 Phillip A. Proger et al., Health care Networks and Managed Care: Antitrust Aspects of




67 See, Proger, supra note 63. (If the IDS only results in vertical integration (e.g., the
IDS consists of one hospital and one physician group with a small percentage of the
physicians in an area), the IDS cannot reduce competition directly, but other issues
might be raised. Proger and his colleagues point up that vertically integrated IDSs may
raise concerns if the network affects competition between network and nonnetwork
providers or the IDS may restrict the ability of competing networks to form.).
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In analyzing horizontal networks, the federal agencies' major concerns
involve agreements on price made by otherwise competing providers.68 The
federal agency Policy Statements 69 indicate that naked agreements among
competitors that fix price or allocate markets are per se illegal. Courts have
found through experience that certain types of conduct are per se illegal because
they are so anticompetitive regardless of the surrounding circumstances that
the court will not examine them in detail,70 and the court will presume the
conduct is anticompetitive and unjustified.
Under the more flexible Rule of Reason analysis, the Agencies identify the
markets where the network affects competition and determine if the providers'
integration is likely to produce significant efficiencies that benefit consumers.
71
6 8 The Policy Statements indicate that if competing providers in a multiprovider
network engage in joint pricing or marketing (e.g., the members collectively agree on
prices or other significant terms of competition), such a joint decision must be related
to significant economic integration among the providers. Sharing substantial financial
risk evidences such economic integration. The Agencies have formally recognized four
situations in which network members share substantial financial risk: (i) providing
services to a health plan at a capitated rate (ii) providing services to a health plan for a
predetermined percentage of premium or revenue (iii) providing significant financial
incentives for network members to achieve specified cost-containment goals (e.g.,
compensation withholds or cost/utilization targets which may be distributed or used
as rewards (or penalties) if goals are met), and (iv) using "global fees" or "all inclusive
case rates" whereby the IDS agrees to provide a complex or extended course of treatment
for a fixed, predetermined payment. See Policy Statements, supra note 60.
69 1d.
7 0
"[C]ombination[s] formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising,
depressing, fixing or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign
commerce" have been held to be illegal per se. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Society, 457 U.S. 332, 347, 73 L.Ed.2d 48, 60 (1982) (quoting United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223, 84 L.Ed. 1129). In Maricopa, the Supreme
Court held an agreement among competing physicians setting, by majority vote,
maximum fees for payment from participants in specified insurance plans to be per se
illegal. The physicians in Maricopa, however, werenot financially integrated. A network
that has no purpose other than to reduce competition among its participants will always
be found to be per se illegal. See, e.g., United States v. Healthcare Partners, Inc., No.
395-CV-09146 RNL (D. Conn. Sept. 13, 1995) (consent decree).
71The Supreme Court has stated that a geographic market is the "area of effective
competition." United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957).
The Agencies rely on their own "Horizontal Merger Guidelines" in defining relevant
markets. A geographic market is defined as the area in which a hospital would be able
to raise prices by a small but significant and lasting amount if it were the only hospital
in that area. DOJ and FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, § 1.0 (1992). Two recent
hospital merger cases show that courts may be taking a more expansive view in defining
relevant markets. In FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260 (8th Cir. 1995), affig 911 F. Supp.
1213 (W.D. Mo. 1995), the Eighth Circuit court of Appeals affirmed a district court
finding that the relevant geographic market for a hospital located in Joplin, Missouri,
included all parts of 13 different counties in Missouri, Kansas and Oklahoma. The court
rejected the FTC's narrow view of the relevant market and concluded the more likely
market included the area where consumers could practically turn for alternative care
and included 17 hospitals up to 54 miles from Joplin in the relevant market. In United
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If price or other agreements that would otherwise be per se illegal among
network providers are reasonably necessary to realize those efficiencies, the
network will not be viewed as being per se illegal. Rather, the network may be
justified as being reasonably related to supporting the network's
procompetitive activities and therefore, not violative of the antitrust laws. 72
The Agencies evaluate substance over form, however, and networks whose
purpose is merely to impede or prevent competitive forces from operating in
the market continue to be illegal.
D. Corporate Practice of Medicine
The corporate practice of medicine doctrine generally prohibits corporations
from engaging in the practice of medicine by employing physicians who
provide professional services on behalf of the corporation. 73 Under this
doctrine, corporations and other entities not controlled by medical
professionals may not hold or otherwise exercise those rights that are vested
only in licensed physicians. The policy behind the law is to prevent any tension
States v. Mercy Health Services, a U.S. District Court in Iowa rejected the DOJ's request
to enjoin the merger of the only two hospitals in Dubuque, Iowa. 902 F. Supp. 968 (N.D.
Iowa 1995) vacated, remanded, 107 F.3d 632 (8th Cir. 1997). The court defined the
geographic market to include other competing hospitals that were as much as 100 miles
away. Although this last case was appealed, it too shows that courts are now more
perceptive to the dynamics of the modern health care industry and agree that patients
are increasingly willing to travel reasonable distances to achieve cost-savings. After the
relevant product and geographic markets are determined, the Agencies will analyze
market share because high market shares will affect the ability of payers to switch among
competing provider networks. Where other networks offering the same or similar types
of services exist or could be formed, third party payers will have the opportunity to
switch between networks if the network's prices become too high or quality becomes
too low.
7 2 0ne of the major concerns addressed in the Policy Statements is that networks will
foreclose competition by impeding the formation of competing networks. Networks
which restrict the ability of members to participate in other networks or plans are more
likely to be deemed anticompetitive. Indicia of a non-exclusive network include: (i)
viable competing networks or plans with adequate provider participation in the market;
(ii) members actually participate in other networks or contract individually with other
payers, or are willing to do so; (iii) members earn substantial revenue outside the
network; (iv) absence of substantial departicipation from other networks in the market;
(v) absence of coordination among members regarding price or other competitively
significant terms of participation in other networks or plans. Supra Policy Statements,
note 56.
73 See Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Carpenter, 10 Cal. App. 2d 592,595 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1935) (In California for example, it has been stated as a general rule of law that a
corporation may not engage in the practice of medicine directly or indirectly by
"engaging [physicians] to perform professional services for those [who] the corporation
contracts to furnish such services."); see also Demetriou & Dutton, supra note 3, at
1300:701.
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between the professional standards and obligations of physicians and the profit
motives of corporations. 74
The policy is based on the assumptions that (i) corporate involvement in the
practice of medicine creates a potential for divided physician loyalty between
the corporation and the patient; (ii) a lay person should not have control over
medical decision making; (iii) a corporation lacks the ability to establish and
maintain the trust requisite to the physician/patient relationship; and (iv) a
corporation may concern itself more with profit levels than with the patient's
quality of care or personal well-being.75
Many states have abolished the doctrine or do not enforce it, although some
states, including Ohio, continue to observe the doctrine.76 Many states have
statutory exceptions which allow professional corporations or associations, 7 7
non-profit health organizations, 78 and foundations 79 to employ or make other
arrangements with physicians so that the corporation or other entity can hold
itself out as a provider of medical services.80
E. Employee Benefits
The organizers of the IDS, as well as its participants, may become subject to
the IRS's aggregation rules which would require that the separate employee
benefit plans among the IDS participants be treated as a single employer for
purposes of determining if the separate plans qualify for favorable tax
treatment. Generally, to receive favorable tax treatment as a qualified plan, the
single employer's benefits plan must not discriminate against lower paid
employees with respect to eligibility or benefits in favor of highly compensated
employees.
74 Id.
75Lisa Rediger Hayward, Comment, Revising Washington's Corporate Practice of
Medicine Doctrine, 71 WASH. L. REV. 403, 406-07 (1996).
76See, e.g., Oi-no REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.41(B) (Baldwin Supp. 1997); TEx. REV. CiV.
STAT. ANN. art. 4495b, §§ 3.08(12) and 3.08 (15) (Vernon's 1997); CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 2400 (West Supp. 1997).
77OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1785.01 (Baldwin Supp. 1997); TEx. REV. ClV. STAT. ANN.
art. 1528f, §§ 2 and 9 (Vernon's 1997).
78TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b, § 5.01 (Vernon's 1997).
7 9 CAL BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2032 (West Supp. 1997).
801n those states that follow the doctrine, care must be taken to ensure that the IDS
meets one of the exceptions to the doctrine or is structured to avoid violating the
prohibition. Some of the factors to consider in determining whether the doctrine applies
include the following: (i) whether the corporation (or other form of entity) influences
the physician's freedom to make clinical decisions; (ii) whether the corporation employs
physicians; (iii) whether any unreasonable fee splitting arrangements may occur; and
(iv) whether the corporation holds itself out to thegeneral public as a providerof medical
services.
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If the IDS contracts with, rather than employs, physicians or a physician's
group to provide physician services, the physicians or physician's group and
the IDS may be treated as an affiliated service group 8' or a controlled group.
82
If so, these otherwise legally separate groups will be treated as a "single
employer" for purposes of applying the minimum participation, coverage and
non-discrimination tests. 83
F Insurance Regulations
As IDSs become more financially integrated and combine traditional payer
functions with delivery of service functions, IDSs begin to resemble health
insurance companies. Health insurers are subject to a myriad of laws and
regulations primarily at the state level.84
Lawmakers are concerned primarily with ensuring that insurers remain
sufficiently capitalized to avoid insolvency and leaving plan subscribers
without health care coverage. 85 To protect consumers, states typically require
that insurance companies maintain substantial capital reserves and submit a
hefty deposit to the state's department of insurance. The concern is particularly
acute for provider run organizations because their experience in actuarial
matters may be insufficient to accurately determine what level of premium is
required to cover a particular risk.8 6 Like regulations for health insurers, HMO
regulations are designed to protect the HMO's members by ensuring that the
81I.R.C. § 414(m)(2), (5).
82See I.R.C. § 414(c)(discussing different types of controlled groups).
831.R.C. §§ 414(b), 414(c), 414(m) (Under the minimum participation test, at least 70
percent of an employer's non-highly compensated employees must be covered by the
plan, or the percentage of non-highly compensated employees covered by the plan must
be at least 70 percent of the percentage of highly compensated employees covered by
the plan. If the plan does not pass the minimum participation test, it can still be a
qualified plan if it passes the coverage test. Under this test, the plan is qualified if i) the
contributions or benefits provided under the plan do not discriminate in favor of highly
compensated employees and ii) the average benefit percentage for non-highly
compensated employees is at least 70 percent of the average benefit percentage for
highly compensated employees.).
84 Jordan supra note 4, at 2300:206-07 (Health insurers are mostly regulated at the state
level. However, HMOs that contract to provide coverage to Medicare enrollees are
subject to various federal regulations. Likewise, self-insured employers that sponsor
health plans for their employees are subject to ERISA laws. ERISA preempts state
regulation of these health plans.).
85 Allison Overbay & Mark Hall, Insurance Regulation of Providers That Bear Risk, 22
AM. J.L. & MED. 361, 368 (1996).
86 Jordan supra note 4, at 2300:204-05 (Insurance laws vary from state to state butsome
common areas of state regulatory interest include: i) the organizational structure of the
insurer; ii) a review of the insurer's financial statements and financial capability; iii)
propriety of reserves and investments; iv) adequacy of proposed premiums; v) policy
forms and other material distributed to consumers; and vi) sales practices and
advertising.).
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HMO remains financially solvent and able to deliver care as promised to the
member.87
Determining who engages in the business of insurance for purposes of
applying insurance laws is often debatable, unless an IDS is clearly organized
as an HMO or otherwise offering a health plan directly to payers. Health care
insurance risk undoubtedly involves some acceptance of responsibility for
future losses. 88 For many IDSs, however, the applicability of insurance
regulations is unclear. State regulators are taking a close look at health
organizations to see if they are acting as insurers by accepting the financial risk
of delivering care. 89 Some states, including Ohio, have proposed or passed
legislation to clarify how insurance regulatory concepts apply in the context of
managed care.90
871d. at 205 (Typically, states attempt to regulate HMOs in the following areas: i) form
of entity and governing body provisions; ii) capital reserve and other financial
requirements; iii) quality assurance; iv) sales and marketing to members; and v) member
and provider grievances.).
88Jordan supra note 4, at 2300:201.
89 See generally id. note 85 at 2300:3106, Working Papers Section (In Ohio, the
Department of Insurance reviews several factors that are outlined in a letter dated July
28, 1994 from the State of Ohio Department of Insurance to the Ohio Hospital
Association, reproduced in the Working Papers Section. The Department review the
following factors in determining whether an entity is engaged in the business of
insurance: i) whether the insured has an insurable interest; ii) whether the insured's
interest is subject to a risk of loss upon the happening of some outlined peril or
contingency; iii) whether the insurer assumes the risk of loss; iv) whether the assumption
is part of a scheme to distribute the losses among a group with similar risks; v) whether
the insured pays a premium as consideration for the insurer's promise to pay; vi)
whether the risk of loss is transferred and spread; vii) whether the practice is an integral
part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured; and viii) whether
the insurance is an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the
insured.).
90The Ohio Department of Insurance unveiled a legislative proposal in 1996 which
was adopted by the Ohio Legislature and is codified in Title 17, Chapter 51 of the Ohio
Revised Code. This law makes Ohio one of the first states to authorize a uniform system
of licensure for all managed care entities. This initiative regulates certain managed care
entities that were not previously within the Department's jurisdiction, including
preferred provider organizations, physician hospital organizations, and point-of-
service plans. According to David Randall, Deputy Director for the Department of
Insurance, "The purpose of the act is to capture within the scope and jurisdiction of the
Department the financial regulation and oversight of all.., organizations which engage
in what amounts to the business of insurance." The law requires managed care
organizations which accept risk for payment or delivery of services under a subscriber
contract to obtain a certificate of authority from the Department to conduct business in
Ohio (the same licensure now required for HMOs). Managed care organizations that
offer both basic and supplemental services must have total admitted assets equal to at
least 110% of liabilities and a net worth not less than $1.5 million. In addition, the Health
Insurance Corporation must maintain a deposit with the Superintendent of Insurance
or an approved custodian of not less than $400,000. On the other hand, organizations
which do not bear risk, but which merely market their services on a purely discounted
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G. Reimbursement regulations
One of the most significant limitations to the formation of any IDS is the
regulations and agency interpretations governing reimbursement for services
provided to Medicare and Medicaid recipients. There are two primary issues
to address in developing the IDS: i) whether the IDS can qualify to receive a
Medicare provider number; and ii) whether the IDS can take reassignment of
a physician's right to Medicare or Medicaid reimbursement pursuant to one of
the exceptions to the reassignment prohibition. 91
Generally speaking, beneficiary's may assign their right to reimbursement
to physicians or other providers of service (e.g., physician groups, hospitals, or
other recognized suppliers).92 However, if a provider is entitled to receive
assignment, there are only limited instances when the provider may reassign
that right to a third party.93 This limitation was implemented to discourage
factoring whereby the provider would assign its right to reimbursement to a
third party at a discount. Congress found these arrangements abusive, and
decided to eliminate the activity.94
If the IDS qualifies as a Medicare provider, it can accept assignment directly
from a beneficiary.95 Otherwise, the IDS may be able to receive Medicare
reimbursement if individual providers in the IDS are authorized to reassign
their rights to reimbursement.96 Medicare will pay reassigned benefits to health
care delivery systems, 97 a physician's employer,9 8 and an inpatient facility
where services are delivered.99
V. IDENTIFYING AND RECONCILING CONFLICTING LAWS AND POLICIES
After considering the IDS clients objectives and reviewing the laws
applicable to the IDS's development, counsel to the IDS begins identifying and
reconciling any conflicting laws and policies. Although the recommended
approach sets forth a series of steps in an ordered sequence, the process is fluid.
fee-for-service basis, will be required only to register with the Department (a process
which is significantly less involved than obtaining a certificate of authority).
91 Demetriou & Dutton, supra note 3, at 1300:701.
9242 C.F.R. Part 424, Subpart D.
9342 C.F.R. § 424.73(a).
94See Medicare and Medicaid Guide § 14,925 (CCH) ("Factoring" or the sale of
accounts receivable to a third party collection organization led to fraud and abuse and
is, therefore, prohibited through the Medicare and Medicaid reassignment rules).
95Demetriou & Dutton, supra note 3, at 1300:901, n. 9.
96Id.
9742 C.F.R. § 424.80(b)(3).
9842 C.F.R. § 424.80(c).
9942 C.F.R. § 424.80(b)(3).
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Certain steps may be taken out of order or not at all, as applicable. Counsel
should, however, attempt to comply with each of the laws or policies
implicated before resorting to step six or recommending that the client avoid
the transaction or activity. Accordingly, this article focuses primarily on steps
four and five in resolving any conflicts. The ensuing discussion provides but a
few examples of this process.
A. Employing Physicians
1. Corporate Practice v. Employee Benefits
a. The Conflict
In order to fulfill its obligations under managed care contracts, an IDS must
provide or arrange for the provision of a variety of physician services. An IDS,
like the one described in Part II, may have a physician group organized as an
independent practice association ("IPA") affiliated with it to provide these
services. IPAs may be formed as an independent network of physicians or the
IPA itself may be associated with other types of providers to form an IDS. In
forming IPAs, the corporate practice of medicine doctrine and the employee
benefits laws may conflict if the physicians members of the IPA desire to
maintain employee benefits packages in addition to those of the IPA.
The corporate practice of medicine doctrine prohibits corporations from
providing medical services unless the corporation is controlled by licensed
physicians.l0 0 The doctrine therefore encourages physicians to form physician
groups as professional corporations. An IPA established as a professional
corporation could, therefore, employ its physician owners and employ or
contract with other physicians to provide services to the IPA's managed care
patients.
Pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, the IPA formed
as a professional corporation and its physician owners might be treated as a
single employer in determining whether the IPA physician owners' employee
benefit plans qualify for favorable tax treatment. 101 As a single employer, the
physician owners' separate plans could be aggregated to determine if the
separate plans meet the nondiscrimination tests.102
If the physicians are willing to forego their separate retirement plans upon
joining the IPA, this conflict is not an issue. On the other hand, if the physician
owners of the IPA wish to maintain equity participation in the IPA and maintain
10OSee supra text accompanying notes 73-80.
101 See supra text accompanying notes 81-83.
102 See I.R.C. §§ 404(a), 402(a) and 401(a). Some of the ramifications for unqualified
plans are: (i) contributions are taxed to the employee in the year in which they vest; (ii)
the earnings of the trust holding the assets of the plan are taxable; and (iii) distributions
are not eligible for certain favorable income averaging rules or IRA rollovers.
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separate retirement plans, compliance with the two bodies of law creates a
conflict.
b. Reconciling the Conflict
To give physicians certain benefits of ownership as well as avoid the
aggregation issues, some commentators advocate establishing the IPA as a
nonprofit mutual benefit corporation. 103 Under this approach, the IPA's
physician members can participate in liquidating distributions but cannot
participate in profit or dividend distributions.1 04 In states where the only
exception to the corporate practice ban is the professional corporation, this
approach may not work however.
An argument can be made that such a nonprofit corporation does not violate
the corporate practice ban because the structure comports with the policies that
underlie the corporate practice prohibition. If only physicians are members of
the entity, then arguably only licensed professionals will be delivering medical
care. Likewise, if the entity is operated not for profit, then judgment concerning
patient care decisions should not be clouded by profit motives. 105
Another way to reconcile this conflict is to establish the physician
organization as a sole shareholder physician organization. Under this
approach, all the physicians interested in participating in the IPA merely do so
as independent contractors but not as equity holders. Independent contract
physicians are at less risk than physician owners of being aggregated with the
IPA as a single employer. 106 Accordingly, physician contractors might be able
to maintain separate qualified employee benefits plans for accumulating
retirement assets.
Although this structure may reconcile the conflict between the corporate
practice ban and the employee benefits laws, the sole shareholder model must
be analyzed to ensure consistency with the IPA's and its physicians' objectives.
For example, physicians may want to participate in the benefits of owning the
IPA. Under the proposed structure, only the sole shareholder could receive
dividends and liquidating distributions.
2. Corporate Practice v. Self-Referral
a. The Conflict
The potential for the IDS to employ physicians highlights another conflict
with the self-referral laws. The physician self-referral laws generally would
103 Peter N. Grant et al., Medical Practice Consolidation: Structural and Legal Issues,
§ 1200.04.B.3.b (BNA's Health L. & Bus. Series No. 1200).
1041d. at § 1200.04.B.3.1. (Grant et al. point up that the inability to distribute profits or
dividends to the members is not an issue to the extent that the IPA distributes all of its
earnings as compensation to its physicians.)
1051d. at § 1200.04.B.3.a.
1061d. at § 1200.04.B.
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prohibit employed or independent contractor physicians from referring
patients to the IDS or other providers within the IDS because of the physician's
compensation arrangement with the IDS. If structured to comply with the
anti-kickback safe harbor 107 and the Stark law exception 108 for employment or
personal services arrangements, however, the physicians could refer patients
to the IDS and its affiliated physicians. 109
The policy that underlies the self-referral laws, therefore, sanctions and
encourages IDS development because the IDS can enter into employment
arrangements with physicians provided the IDS does not provide the
physicians financial incentives to overutilize services. 110 This policy is directly
in conflict, however, with the corporate practice of medicine ban 111 which
hinders IDS development by preventing the IDS from employing
physicians.112 The ban has been strongly criticized as inappropriate in today's
health care environment which is focused on cost containment rather than
merely increasing profits through maximizing referrals. 113
b. Reconciling the Conflict
One approach to reconciling this apparent conflict is for the IDS to establish
effective control over an affiliated physician organization which has been
formed as an entity not subject to the corporate practice of medicine ban (e.g.,
a professional corporation, a foundation in California, a nonprofit health
corporation in Texas). The controlled entity then employs the physicians.
10742 C.F.R. § 1001.952(i) (employee safe harbor) and 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(d) (personal
service safe harbor).
10842 C.F.R. § 411.357(c) (employee exception) and 42 C.F.R. § 411.357(d) (employee
exception).
109 These regulations generally require a bona fide arrangement exists whereby the
physician receives fair market value for the services, and the compensation
arrangements are not based on the volume or value of referrals.
1101n the context of managed care, this policy is observed; however, physicians are
now being regulated to discourage underutilization which may occur under managed
care physician compensation methodologies.
111See supra text accompanying notes 77-80 for a discussion of various statutory
exceptions to the doctrine.
112 President Clinton's original Health Security Act recognized this problem and
contained a provision which would have preempted corporate practice of medicine for
certain managed care organizations. Unfortunately, this provision was not enacted in
the final version of the bill. Hitchner et al., supra note 4, at 274; H.R. 3600, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. § 1407(b) "Any state law related to the corporate practice of medicine ... shall
not apply to arrangements between health plans that are not fee-for-service plans and
their participating providers.").
113Hitchner et al., supra note 9, at 274; see also Jeffrey F. Chase-Lubitz, The Corporate
Practice of Medicine Doctrine: An Anachronism in the Modern Health Care Industry, 40 VAND.
L. REV. 445,458-88 (1987).
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The physician owner of the separate entity is subject to a trust or share control
agreement which gives the IDS authority to approve certain shareholder
actions such as the appointment of new directors to the controlled entity's
board. 114 The IDS can exert more control over the physician organization if it
contracts to manage the organization's day-to-day operations. By effectively
controlling board appointments to the organization and controlling day-to-day
management of the organization, the IDS maintains governance and
operational control over the organization.
Under the physician trust model, the IDS creates a trust, appoints a physician
as trustee, and then delivers funds to the trustee to develop the affiliated
physician group. The IDS is designated the beneficial owner of the trust.115 A
professional corporation is formed, and the trustee uses the trust's funds to
purchase the professional corporation's shares. The professional corporation
then employs physicians to deliver services on behalf of the IDS. Through the
trust documents, the IDS can maintain substantial control over the professional
corporation's actions by requiring the physician shareholder to obtain IDS
consent before voting on important strategic matters, such as the sale of
substantially all of the organization's assets or the dissolution of the
organization.
The share control agreement model is similar to the trust model. Under this
approach, the physician organization is also organized as a sole shareholder
professional corporation. A trust is not created; however, the IDS controls the
professional corporation through a share control agreement whereby the
physician shareholder agrees to obtain the IDS's consent before voting on
certain matters.116
Another model which has been used to avoid the corporate practice
prohibition is the MSO in which the IDS owns the affiliated physicians' practice
assets through the MSO. The physicians continue to practice medicine in
114Not only will these models help to alleviate the corporate practice of medicine
concerns, as discussed herein, these models will also help the IDS to avoid private
benefit/private inurement problems under the tax exemption laws and help any
contract physicians to the physician organization maintain separate employee benefits
plans.
115The Ohio Attorney General has approved the transfer of a beneficial interest in
stock of a professional corporation to a person who is not duly licensed to render
professional services. For example, in 85 Ohio Att'y Gen. Op. 065, the Ohio Attorney
General opined that a trustee can hold shares in an Ohio professional corporation for
the benefit of non-licensed beneficiaries, so long as the trustee is duly licensed. Further,
in 90 Ohio Att'y Gen. Op. 072, the Ohio Attorney General opined that a trust can be used
to provide financial benefit to unlicensed individuals from licensed professional
activities.
116See I.R.S. determination letter to Marietta Health Care Physicians, Inc., dated
October 3, 1995 on file with the authors, in which the I.R.S. granted tax-exempt status
to a physician organization controlled by a hospital using the share control model. The
applicant relied on the reasoning in the O.A.G. opinions cited supra in note 115 to
convince the I.R.S. that the hospital's control was not a violation of the corporate practice
ban.
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compliance with the corporate practice doctrine because they maintain
separate practices and bill directly for services provided. The MSO leases the
assets to the physicians and provides administrative services through the MSO.
Under any of these models, the IDS minimizes the legal risks associated with
the corporate practice doctrine. The IDS can argue that it is not directly
employing physicians and, therefore, is not violating the prohibition. Provided
the employment or independent contractor arrangements between physicians
and the controlled entity comply with the self-referral laws, the apparent
conflict should be reconciled.
B. Physician/Hospital Ventures: Tax v. Self Referral
1. The Conflict
As market forces encourage providers to organize collectively, tax-exempt
hospitals and for profit physician organizations, like those in the hypothetical
IDS, may pool their resources to develop IDSs as some form of joint venture.
Hospitals and physicians use joint ventures to develop working alliances,
minimize conflicting economic incentives, promote shared loyalties, enhance
capital access, and generate additional revenues. 117 The tax laws and the
self-referral prohibitions, however, affect the tax-exempt hospital's and the
physicians' ability to invest freely in the venture. Physician participants in the
IDS may also become subject to intermediate sanctions if they receive an excess
benefit from the transaction.1 1 8
Under IRS policy regarding joint ventures, the private inurement and private
benefit 119 prohibitions are implicated. The primary concerns when a
tax-exempt organization enters into a transaction with a for profit entity are (i)
whether the financial or nonfinancial arrangements allow the inurement of the
nonprofit hospital participant's net earnings to any private shareholder or
individual (the physician investors in the hypothetical IDS); and (ii) whether
the joint venture will confer a benefit to private interests substantial enough to
demonstrate that the tax-exempt hospital is operating for private benefit rather
than for public purposes. 120 The IRS's position regarding hospital-physician
joint ventures is discussed in General Counsel Memorandum 39862.
The IRS established that tax-exempt hospitals can jeopardize their
tax-exempt status if the hospital shares its net profits from ancillary services
117Woodhall, supra note 3, at 223.
118Additionally, physician participants who are considered "disqualified persons"
under the intermediate sanctions laws may be subject to intermediate sanctions as
discussed in Part III. See supra text accompanying notes 52-53 for a discussion of the new
intermediate sanctions laws.
119See supra text accompanying notes 46-53 for a discussion of the laws affecting
tax-exempt organizations.
1 2 0 DOUGLAS M. MANCINO, TAXATION OF HOSPITALS AND HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS,
11-2 (1996)
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with the hospital's staff physicians. More importantly, the IRS stated that
violations of the anti-kickback statute are inconsistent with continued
tax-exempt status and suggested that private letter rulings will be contingent
upon compliance with the self-referral laws.12 1 A conflict could arise, therefore,
if a joint venture passes muster under IRS analysis but fails to satisfy a safe
harbor or exception under the self-referral laws, especially given that
self-referral laws appear to be less tolerant of physician-hospital joint ventures.
Although the anti-kickback statute has recently been amended to encourage
capitation and other managed care reimbursement arrangements, 122 only
limited safe harbors exist to protect a physician's investment interest in an
IDS.123 The Office of the Inspector General (the "OIG") issued a special fraud
alert in 1989124 in which the OIG expressed its concern with joint ventures
formed by tax-exempt hospitals primarily to lock up referral streams from
physician investors, rather than to engage in legitimate activities. Particularly
suspect are arrangements where the amount of capital invested is
disproportionate to the return on the physician investor's capital. 125
The Stark self-referral prohibitions are even more restrictive because, unlike
the anti-kickback statutes, physicians may violate the Stark laws regardless of
their motive. 12 6 Unless the joint venture IDS operates in a rural area or the
1 2 1 General Counsel Memorandum 39862, at 29.
1 2 2 Section 216 of the Health Insurance and Portability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
110 Stat. 1936 (1996) includes a managed care exception for risk-sharing arrangements.
The exception allows remuneration between a Medicare-qualified HMO and an
individual or entity providing items or services pursuant to a written agreement
between the parties. The amendment also allows remuneration between an individual
and an organization or entity if a written agreement places the individual at substantial
financial risk for the cost or utilization of the items or services the individual is obligated
to provide. This exception is broader than existing safe harbors and recognizes that
managed care arrangements reverse traditional physician incentives to overutilize
services.
12 3 Counsel should determine the applicability of the safe harbors for (i) personal
service and management contracts, 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(d); leases, 42 C.F.R. §
1001.952(b) &(c); small entity investments, 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(a)(2); and large entity
investment interests, 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(a)(1). Proposed safe harbors include:
investment interests in rural areas, ambulatory surgical centers and group practices
composed of active investors. 58 Fed. Reg. 49008 (9/21/93).
12 4 See Medicare and Medicaid Guide 38,448 (CCH 1990).
12 5 Another provision in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996, Section 205, allows the public to request advisory opinions from the department
of Health and Human Services regarding whether a particular arrangement constitutes
grounds for penalty under the anti-kickback, civil money penalty and exclusion statutes.
The opinion is binding only on the requesting party, similar to IRS's private letter
rulings, and undoubtedlywill help provide guidance to practitioners in this murky area.
12 6 See supra text accompanying note 55 for a discussion of the significance of the intent
requirement.
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physician and hospitals completely integrate, it is unlikely that the any of the
exceptions to the Stark laws will apply.127
2. Reconciling the Conflict
In this example, there are three competing bodies of law which must be
reconciled. Although the IRS has taken a more flexible approach than the OIG
or the Department of Health and Human Services in analyzing
hospital-physician joint ventures, these areas appear to be reconcilable if the
policies underlying the laws are satisfied. In a sense, these policies can be
satisfied if the IDS venture is engaged in a legitimate activity, the physician
investors profit from the venture is proportional to their investment, and the
IDS operates to discourage overutilization. An IDS structured and operated
with these principals in mind minimizes the possibility that physicians will
benefit at the expense of the tax-exempt participant and that physicians will
have a financial incentive to refer to the joint venture.
IRS policy should not inhibit a tax-exempt organization's participation in
legitimate joint ventures designed to benefit the community because G.C.M.
39862 only applies if a tax-exempt hospital sells its revenue streams to the
venture. Ventures that are structured to avoid this limitation, further charitable
purposes, and benefit the community appear to be encouraged under current
IRS policy.
Such ventures include ones that (i) establish a new health care provider,
service, or resource in the community; (ii) raise capital for a bona fide project
or purpose (iii) own or lease a separate provider facility or service; (iv) involve
substantial risk sharing or pooling of expertise; and (v) measurably improve
quality of service in an area. 128 To the extent the venture does not meet any
safe-harbor or exception under the self-referral laws, the IDS must be
structured so that (i) the physician's investment interest in the IDS is not
considered remuneration intended to induce a referral; and (ii) the IDS is not
considered an entity to which a physician can refer for the provision of
Medicare or Medicaid services.
Under the anti-kickback statute, an argument can be made that distributions
to the physician investors are not intended to induce referrals provided any
distributions to the physician are proportional to their investment. A way to
satisfy this policy is suggested by the structure of the hypothetical IDS in which
preferred stock is provided to the hospital. The hospital member would receive
preferred distributions (both profit and liquidating) as well as preferred voting
rights (the right to break deadlocks among the board on strategic issues)
because the hospital will make a larger initial capital contribution.
Another way to minimize anti-kickback concerns is to avoid making any
profit distributions to the physician investors. Physicians could still participate
12 7See infra notes 148 and 150 discussing the rural investment interest and hospital
investment exceptions respectively.
128Mancino, supra note 120, at 11-16.
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in governance as voting members in the IDS and participate financially through
their compensation arrangements. 129 Compensation arrangements can be
structured under the self-referral laws to avoid providing incentives for
physicians to overutilize services and to replicate equity type distributions
based on overall IDS performance. By implementing these protections, the IDS
structure helps to minimize private inurement and private benefit concerns as
well as Stark concerns.
Under the Stark laws, an argument can be made that the physician investors
cannot engage in a prohibited referral because the IDS is not a provider of
services as defined under Medicare or Medicaid laws; therefore, it is impossible
for the physicians to make referrals to the IDS for the provision of Medicare or
Medicaid services.130 The IDS can also argue it complies with the policies that
underlie the Stark law if its utilization review program discourages physicians
from overutilization. Overutilization may also be discouraged if the physicians
do not participate in profit distributions and physician compensation is tied to
managed care utilization goals.
Other options for the IDS to minimize any Stark concerns are to provide
designated health services through the affiliated physician organization,
completely integrate physician and hospital operations, 131 or not to offer
physicians equity in the IDS. The physician organization may also be
structured to meet the requirements of the in-office ancillary services
exception. 132
C. Accepting Risk: Anti-Trust, Insurance and Tax
1. The Conflict
Under federal antitrust enforcement policy, an IDS can avoid antitrust
challenges if the providers in the IDS integrate economically by sharing
substantial financial risk. This can occur if the IDS and its providers agree to
enter capitation, withhold or other at-risk reimbursement arrangements with
payers.133 If the IDS itself enters into risk-sharing arrangements with payers to
129Compensation arrangement are more flexible under the self-referral laws because
safe harbors and exceptions exist for remuneration paid to employees and independent
contract physicians.
130 See supra text accompanying notes 55-59 for a discussion of the Stark laws.
131 esupra note 122, discussing the definition of remuneration under the anti-kickback
statute which excludes payment made to an individual pursuant to an arrangement that
places the individual at substantial financial risk for the provision of services. This
provision would protect participants in a fully integrated IDS and recognizes that
participants in such an IDS have no incentive to overutilize services. Unfortunately, the
Health Insurance and Portability Act of 1996 does not include similar revisions to the
Stark prohibitions.
13242 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)(2).
1335ee supra text accompanying notes 60-72 for an overview of antitrust enforcement
policy issues.
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avoid antitrust scrutiny, however, the IDS risks engaging in the business of
insurance and could become subject to additional state mandated financial
requirements and restrictions applicable to insurance companies such as
solvency requirements, deposits 134 and financial reserves. 135
These two bodies of law often create a conflict because many IDSs, to avoid
the additional financial requirements for insurers under state law, may avoid
activity which could result in the IDS being classified as an insurer.1 36 If the
IDS participants share financial risk to avoid scrutiny under the antitrust laws,
the IDS risks being designated a state law insurer. Federal tax law can also
create tax liability problems for an IDS that does not hold an insurance license.
In determining taxable income, federal tax law allows life insurance
companies 1 3 7 to deduct reserve items such as insurance reserves, 13 8 unearned
premiums and unpaid losses,1 3 9 certain dividend accumulations, 14 0 and
13 4 See supra note 90 (discussing financial solvency and reserve requirements in Ohio's
new managed care legislation).
13 5 See Oi-no REV. CODE ANN. § 3925.19 (Baldwin Supp. 1997) (which provides that
insurance companies may provide for the accumulation of a permanent fund to pay
losses and expenses when the liabilities of the company exceed the available cash funds
of the company); see also OHIo ADMIN. CODE § 3901-3-13 (Baldwin 1997)(discussing the
minimum reserve standards for group health insurance contracts). Whether an IDS is a
health insurer will undoubtedly involve the consideration of two important questions:
i) does the IDS merely arrange for another to provide services or is the IDS the provider
of services; and ii) whether the IDS is receiving capitation payments for the services
provided by the IDS or by the IDS's contract providers directly from a payer. Demetriou
& Dutton supra note 3, at 1300:704; see also Jordan, supra note 4, at 2300:202 (citing The
Health Plan Accountability Working Group, National Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs, Suggested
Bulletin Regarding Certain Types of Compensation and Reimbursement Arrangements
Between Health Care Providers and Individuals, Employers and Other Groups (Aug.
10, 1995) (The Health Plan Accountability Working Group of the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners concluded that any group of providers is engaged in the
business of insurance whenever it contracts directly with an employer to provide future
health care services on a fixed prepaid basis. The working group cautioned, however,
against taking a cookie cutter approach to determining which organizations are
accepting insurance risk and stated that the facts and circumstance of each situation
must be evaluated.)).
13 6 To a certain extent, the policies and rationale that underlie the antitrust laws and
the insurance laws are in harmony. Both encourage and allow providers to integrate
through the sharing of financial risk among the providers in the IDS as well as with
external payers, even though the IDS could become subject to the solvency, deposit or
reserve requirements.
13 7
"Life insurance" companies include companies that issue noncancellable contracts
of health and accident insurance provided certain requirements are met. See I.R.C.
§ 816(b) (1996)(life insurance defined).
13 8 I.R.C. § 807(c)(1)(1996)(reference to § 816(b)).
13 9 1.R.C. § 807(c)(2)(reference to § 816(c)(2).
14 0 See I.R.C. § 807(c)(4).
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certain reasonable contingency reserves. 14 1 For insurers other than life
insurance companies, these items are generally included in gross income and
not deductible. 142
Under the federal tax law definition, any reserves maintained for future
claims or unearned premiums may be taxable at the IDS level. Any amounts
from these reserves or unearned premiums that are later distributed to the IDS's
owners could also become subject to a second level of taxation. This creates a
problem for equity participants in the IDS who are trying to minimize their tax
liability.
2. Reconciling the Conflicts
If the IDS has sufficient available capital to meet the financial requirements
for insurance companies and the IDS intends to become licensed as an insurer
as well as enter a risk relationship with payers, these conflicts become moot.
Exposure under the anti-trust laws would be minimized because the IDS could
be considered integrated for purposes of anti-trust analysis. The IDS might also
avoid the double taxation problem for reserve items because such items are
deductible in computing taxable income.
These conflicting issues become especially troublesome, however, for the
IDS that is transitioning from the fee-for-service regime to the managed care
environment and has not yet embraced the concept of completely integrating
payer and provider functions or assuming financial risk on all payer contracts.
One way for the transitional IDS to avoid the double taxation issue is to form
the IDS as a limited lability company as suggested by the hypothetical IDS. By
receiving pass through taxation, the equity participants can avoid taxation on
reserve items at the entity level. This approach will help to eliminate the double
taxation problem.
A recent change in federal antitrust enforcement policy may allow the
transitional IDS to not only avoid insurer classification but also avoid antitrust
challenges. In a revision from the previous Policy Statements, 143 some
multiprovider networks may now qualify for rule of reason analysis even if the
network members do not share substantial financial risk. For example,
networks that do not share substantial financial risk may be able to
demonstrate clinical integration substantial enough to produce efficiency
benefits for consumers and justify joint pricing among the members.
Examples of substantial clinical integration given in the Policy Statements
include: (1) establishing mechanisms to monitor and control utilization, control
costs and assure quality of care; (2) selectively choosing providers that are likely
to further efficiency objectives; and (3) investing significant capital, both
monetary and human, to build the infrastructure and capability to realize the
14 1 See I.R.C. § 807(c)(6).
142 See I.R.C. § 832(c)(establishing general deductions for insurance companies other
than life insurance companies).
143 See supra note 60.
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claimed efficiencies. By clinically integrating rather than financially
integrating, the IDS may be considered integrated for purposes of avoiding
antitrust scrutiny. The IDS might also not be considered engaged in the
business of insurance because the IDS participants are not assuming insurance
risk.
D. IDS Reimbursement: Medicare Provider Status v. Self-referral
1. The Conflict
If the IDS is to provide services to Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries, it
would be advantageous for the IDS to become a Medicare and Medicaid
provider with a unique identification number so that the IDS could receive
reimbursement directly from Medicare. IDSs, like the hypothetical IDS, may
qualify for a Medicare provider number as a health care delivery system.144
Health care delivery systems are organizations that provide and administer
health care to individuals or groups through an organized system, 145 such as
a clinic. 146
Considering the hypothetical IDS as an example, if the IDS becomes a
Medicare provider, however, the IDS may have effectively created a problem
for its physician investors under the self-referral laws. 147 Under the Stark laws,
physician investors may not refer a Medicare or Medicaid patient to an entity
in which they have an ownership or investment interest for the provision of
designated health services, unless one of the Stark exceptions applies.14 8
144Demetriou & Dutton supra note 3, at 1300:901 n.9 (Demetriou and Dutton argue
that "health care delivery systems" can be considered suppliers in their own right. 42
C.F.R. § 424.80(c) provides that a health care delivery system, facility or employer
receiving Medicare assignment will be considered the supplier of the services for
purposes of subparts C, D, and E. 42 C.F.R. § 424.55 provides that a supplier accepting
assignment can receive payment directly from Medicare, but the supplier will be bound
by all the conditions of having accepted assignment).
145Medicare Carrier's Manual Section 3060.3 (The Carrier's Manual describes four
types of health care delivery systems: i) medical group clinics; ii) carrier dealing
prepayment organizations; iii) direct-dealing health care prepayment plans; and iv)
direct-dealing HMOs and competitive medical plans).
1461d. at 3060.3.C (It is debatable whether the IDS would meet the requirements for
being a clinic which is defined as freestanding entity such as a physician, medical group
or imaging center. An IDS may not meet this definition depending on the Medicare
carrier's policy.).
147See supra text accompanying notes 55-59 for a discussion of the self-referral laws.
148 0ne exception that is worth reviewing in this situation is the exception to the
referral prohibition related to ownership or investment interests in facilities located in
rural areas. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(d)(2); see 42 C.F.R. § 411.356(C)(1). It is unlikely that the
IDS would qualify for the in-office ancillary services exception, because it most likely
would not qualify as a group practice as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(h)(4).
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2. Reconciling the Conflict
If the IDS is not considered a Medicare or Medicaid provider of services and
is merely arranging for others to provide the services, some commentators
argue that a physician could not make a referral to it. Therefore, the Stark
prohibitions arguably would not prevent the physicians from holding an
ownership interest in the IDS.149 The conflict in this situation for the IDS is
apparent because on the one hand, the IDS would want to participate in
Medicare and Medicaid as a provider for reimbursement purposes, but on the
other, the IDS would want to avoid becoming a Medicare provider due to the
Stark implications.
Given the importance of offering physician's equity in the IDS,
unfortunately, many IDS's will avoid becoming a Medicare or Medicaid
provider. This situation is an example of a conflict where the specific goal of
the IDS, to become a Medicare provider for reimbursement purposes, may be
outweighed by the broader goal of providing physicians incentives to
participate in the IDS. Of course, if the IDS is not a Medicare provider, the IDS
will not be authorized to accept assignmentfor physician's services including
ancillary services. This result can be mitigated somewhat if the IDS becomes
the billing agent for the independent physicians in the IDS as well as the
affiliated physician group. If the IDS fully integrates physician and hospital
services, the IDS could also seek a Medicare provider number without negative
implications under the Stark laws. Physicians could be equity participants
consistent with the Stark regulations concerning prepaid plans or investment
interests in hospitals.150
VI. CONCLUSION
The health care industry is changing at a rapid pace due to the spiraling costs
of delivering care. Integrated delivery systems are being developed to improve
the quality of care while simultaneously reducing costs. Because integrated
systems were not contemplated when many of the existing health laws were
adopted, these regulations often conflict in ways that dissuade system
formation and operation.
Traditional methods for conflicts resolution are often inadequate, but
traditional theory provides insights for developing a methodology to reconcile
competing legislative and administrative laws and policies. This article
suggests a systematic, client-objective oriented approach to conflicts resolution
which can be summarized as follows:
14 9Demetriou & Dutton, supra note 3, at 1300:613.
15042 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)(3) & § 1395nn(d)(3) (Physician ownership or investment
interest in prepaid plans and hospitals are excepted from the referral ban. Prepaid plans
include federally qualified HMOs, demonstration projects and plans that heave entered
into Medicare risk contracts.).
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(i) Analyze the structure and the client's goals in developing
the IDS or engaging in the particular transaction and
identify the apparent conflicts in law or policy;
(ii) Reconsider and prioritize the client's objectives in
developing the IDS in light of the conflict and any legal
barriers created by the conflict;
(iii) Promote the more important law or policy after considering
the relative importance of the conflicting laws and their
underlying policies; and
(iv) Reconfigure the IDS's business arrangement after
considering exceptions to the law or regulation, agency
interpretations regarding the conflict or any alternative
organizational structures and operational arrangements
that both accomplish the client's goals and meet the legal
requirements of each of the conflicting laws or policies.
If the conflict cannot be reconciled by following this approach, counsel for
the IDS can urge compliance with the laws that satisfy the client's most
important objectives or consider tabling the transaction until there is a change
in the conflicting laws or policies.
As the health care industry adjusts to meet changing market demands,
legislative and administrative bodies will continue to promulgate conflicting
laws and regulations and thereby create obstacles to the legitimate business
objectives of the organizers of the IDS. Legal counsel must facilitate the process
of complying with these laws and policies while meeting the client's objectives.
The methodology discussed in this article should provide counsel to the IDS
with a valuable tool in this endeavor.
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